We theoretically and empirically examine the relationship between natural resource revenues and financial development. In the theoretical part, we present a politico-economic model in which contract enforcement is low and decreasing in resource revenues when political institutions are poor, but high otherwise. As poor contract enforcement leads to low financial development, the model predicts that resource revenues hinder financial development in countries with poor political institutions, but not in countries with comparatively better political institutions. We test our theoretical predictions systematically using panel data covering the period 1970 to 2005 and 133 countries. Our estimates confirm our theoretical predictions.
Introduction
Are natural resource revenues a curse or a blessing for financial development? An incumbent government endowed with natural resource revenues may find it easier to invest in contract enforcement and the rule of law, which may be important for both economic and financial development. But, on the other hand, an incumbent government does not need a prospering manufacturing sector to enrich itself if it has easy access to resource rents.
Thus it may put less emphasis on improving contract enforcement, such that financial development may end up being lower. In this paper, we take a closer look at the relationship between natural resource revenues and financial development. In particular, we investigate both theoretically and empirically whether and how the quality of political institutions affects this relationship.
In the theoretical part, we present a stylized politico-economic model of an economy with an incumbent government, many citizens, and a firm. The firm hires labor and borrows capital from the citizens in order to produce final goods. After production and wage payments, it decides whether or not to pay back the citizens' capital and its interest debt. If it fails to pay back capital and interest debt, then a share of the firm's profit net of wage payments is confiscated. This share measures the level of contract enforcement or, more generally, the quality of contracting institutions. Citizens prefer lending less capital to the firm if the level of contract enforcement is low. The incumbent government chooses the level of contract enforcement as well as the corruption level. We assume that a trade-off between the two exists, e.g., because establishing and promoting contract enforcement requires resources that could otherwise be appropriated. 1 After the incumbent government's policy choice and the production of final goods, the citizens can try to oust the incumbent government in midterm elections. If they try, they are successful only with a certain probability, which increases in the quality of political institutions. The incumbent government gets the official salary and corruption revenues if and only if it remains in office. Citizens are best off with zero corruption and strong contract enforcement.
In equilibrium, the incumbent government chooses high corruption and low contract enforcement in the presence of high natural resource revenues and weak political institutions. As a result citizens lend less capital to the firm and the economy experiences low financial development. But when political institutions are strong, the incumbent government chooses strong contract enforcement, independently of resource revenues, which leads to high financial development. Our model thus predicts that natural resource revenues hinder financial development in countries with poor political institutions, but not in countries with comparatively better political institutions.
In the empirical part, we test our theoretical prediction systematically using a reduced form model and panel data covering the periods 1970 to 2005 and 1870 to 1940, and 133 and 31 countries, respectively. Our fixed effect and instrumental variables estimates confirm that the relationship between natural resource revenues and financial development depends on the quality of political institutions. In particular, we find that resource revenues are negatively associated with financial development in countries that have an average POLITY2 score of around 8 or less over the period 1970 to 2005. Our main results hold when we control for the effects of log income, time varying common shocks and various additional covariates. We notice that the effect is a demonstrable empirical fact even after controlling for possible Dutch Disease effects by using terms of trade and trends in commodity prices. It is also robust to various alternative measures of financial development and political institutions, as well as across different samples and data frequencies. Evidence for the 1870 to 1940 period is weaker as we get statistically significant estimates only when a democracy dummy from Polity IV is used. Using cross-sectional data we further present evidence that is consistent with our theoretical model according to which natural resources rents hinder financial development in the presence of weak political institutions by lowering contract enforcement and the quality of contracting institutions.
We make the following contributions in this paper. First, we present a theoretical model that demonstrates why we should expect the effect of natural resource revenues on financial development to depend on the quality of political institutions. Second, using a reduced form econometric model and panel data for the period 1970 to 2005 covering 133 countries, we show that the effect of natural resource revenues on financial development indeed depends on the quality of political institutions. It is noteworthy that the use of panel data is a significant departure from most existing studies on natural resources or financial development, as they typically present results driven by cross-country variation.
Third, we also find support (even though not robust) for our model prediction using panel data for the period 1870 to 1940 and 31 countries. To the best of our knowledge, no other empirical studies on natural resources or financial development use panel data for this early period.
There is a large literature on the causes of financial development. However, the literature that focuses on the effect of natural resources on financial development is rather small. Beck et al. (2003) are perhaps the first to establish an explicit link between natural resources and financial development. Their endowment theory of financial development runs as follows: Resource endowment and disease environment encountered by the colonizers influenced the quality and nature of the colonial institutions they erected. In natural resource abundant countries the initial distribution of wealth favored the elite and they erected extractive institutions (see Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997) . In countries with unfavorable disease environment the colonizers decided not to settle and erected extractive institutions (see Acemoglu et al., 2001 ). These extractive institutions characterized by weak property rights and contract enforcement persisted over time and continue to negatively influence financial development and economic development. Beck et al. (2003) find 4 that the endowment theory explains the majority of the cross-country variation in financial development using a cross-section sample of 70 former colonies. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) show that endowment impacts on financial development through property rights institutions (which protect citizens from expropriation by those in power) and not through contracting institutions (which regulate transactions among private citizens). In contrast,
we focus on the effects of current natural resource rents on financial development and how the quality of political institutions influences this relationship. We show that resource rents coupled with weak political institutions are a hindrance to financial development.
Initial endowment, initial property rights institutions, and initial political institutions are likely to be correlated (Engerman et al. 1998 ). They are also likely to be persistent.
Therefore, a valid question would be whether we are picking up the effects of initial endowment and property rights institutions on financial development, and not the effects of political institutions. As we use country fixed effects, it is clear that our results cannot be driven by initial endowment. Further we test the robustness of our results by explicitly controlling for property rights institutions, as measured by expropriation risk and executive constraints. Our results remain robust. Therefore the effect that we identify is over and above any effect that resource endowment may have on financial development through property rights institutions.
In a related paper Rajan and Zingales (2003) propose the interest group theory of financial development. Their theory predicts that incumbent financiers are likely to use their market power to oppose financial development in order to avoid competition. Further, they predict that incumbent financiers opposition will be weaker in the presence of trade and financial openness. They find evidence in support of their theory using data from 24 
The Model
There is an economy inhabited by a measure-one continuum of citizens, a firm, and an incumbent government.
We first introduce the economic part of the model: Each citizen is endowed with one capital unit and one labor unit. A subset of citizens own the firm. 6 The firm hires workers and borrows capital from the citizens to produce final goods Y with the Cobb-Douglas production technology Y = L α K 1−α , where α ∈ (0, 1). Citizens supply their labor unit inelastically, such that L = 1; and the labor market is perfectly competitive. We take the amount of capital K that citizens lend to the firm as our measure of financial development (which is consistent with standard empirical measures of financial development based on credits to the private sector). After having produced goods Y and having paid wages w, the firm decides whether or not to pay back capital K and its interest debt rK. If it fails to pay back capital and interest debt, the share λ of the firm's profit net of wage payment is confiscated, where λ is a measure of contract enforcement. Aggregate income in the economy is the sum of domestic production Y and the exogenous natural resource rents Ω.
We now turn to the political part of the model: The incumbent government can choose the level of contract enforcement λ ∈ [0, 1] as well as the level of corruption θ
where τ is an exogenous tax rate used to finance government salaries. The government's total revenues are (τ + θ)(Y + Ω). We assume that there is a trade-off between contract enforcement and corruption. Such a trade-off may exist for various reasons: First, establishing and promoting the rule of law, in general, and contract enforcement, in particular, may be costly. Hence better contract enforcement may leave fewer resources that can potentially be appropriated by the government. Second, appropriating resources may become more difficult and costly when the rule of law is established. Third, different politicians 6 Our results do not depend on how large this subset is. They even hold if the firm is owned by one or all citizens.
7 may be good in fostering contract enforcement and engaging in corruption, respectively, such that a head of government who primarily appoints ministers that are good in fostering contract enforcement may end up with a cabinet that does poorly in appropriating resources. Fourth, governments might be time constrained, such that more time devoted to fostering contract enforcement leaves less time for corrupt activities. For simplicity we model this trade-off between contract enforcement and corruption by assuming that the incumbent government is time constrained, and that its choices of λ and θ must satisfy λ + θ ≤ 1.
7
After the incumbent government's policy choices and the production of final goods, the citizens can try to oust the incumbent government in midterm elections. 8 If they try, they are successful with probability p, where p is a measure of the quality of political institutions. Hence, the better the political institutions are, the more likely it is that the incumbent government gets ousted in midterm elections when the citizens want to oust it.
If the citizens are successful, a caretaker government takes over and pays the corruption revenues back to the citizens. The timing of the game is as follows: First, the incumbent government chooses λ and θ. Second, the firm hires labor and capital to produce Y . Third, the firm decides whether to pay back capital and interest debt. Fourth, the citizens decide whether to make an attempt to replace the incumbent government.
Equilibrium Analysis
We derive our results in three steps. First we derive the equilibrium of the economy and financial development for any λ and θ. Second we derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the political game using backward induction. We then discuss how a change in resource rents affects financial development in the politico-economic equilibrium.
As the labor market is perfectly competitive, and the citizens supply their labor inelastically, it holds in equilibrium that L = 1 and w = (1 − τ − θ)αK 1−α . The firm's post wage payment profit is therefore Π = (
The capital market outcomes, i.e., interest rate r and the amount of capital borrowed K both depend on contract enforcement λ. In particular, citizens never lend so much capital that the firm may decide not to repay the capital and its interest debt. Hence,
increases in λ, but decreases in θ and r, and that Φ(λ, θ, r) < 1 for any λ, θ and r ≥ 0.
Hence citizens will never lend all capital, and competition between citizens drives the interest rate down to zero. Given λ and θ, financial development is thus K = Φ(λ, θ, 0), and domestic production is Y = Φ(λ, θ, 0) α . Consequently, K and Y are both increasing in contract enforcement λ and decreasing in corruption θ.
We now turn to the political game. Having observed the incumbent government's choices of λ and θ, and the resulting market outcomes, the citizens try to oust the incumbent government if and only if the incumbent government is corrupt, i.e., if and only if θ > 0.
The reason is that it is too late for them to undo poor market outcomes due to low λ, but not too late to get corruption revenues back when θ > 0.
Knowing the effect of its policy choices on market outcomes and the citizens' political decision, the incumbent government either chooses the best uncorrupt strategy, i.e., λ = 1 and θ = 0, or it maximizes total revenues (τ + θ)[Φ(λ, θ, 0) α + Ω]. These strategies yield
The incumbent government prefers the best uncorrupt strategy if We now turn to the effect of higher resource rents Ω on financial development in the politico-economic equilibrium:
Proposition 1 A marginal increase in resource rents Ω reduces financial development K if p < p , i.e., if political institutions are relatively weak, but has no effect on K otherwise.
Proof: If p ≥ p , then K = Φ(1, 0, 0) for any Ω. Hence a marginal change in Ω has no
In case of a border solution, a marginal change in Ω has no effect on θ and, hence, K = Φ(1 − θ, θ, 0). In case of an interior solution, the optimal θ must satisfy the first-order then the incumbent trades off the benefit of better contract enforcement, which is higher domestic production, against the cost of less time available for corrupt activities. As resource rents increase, domestic production becomes relatively less important and the incumbent government thus increases corruption and lowers contract enforcement, which translates into lower financial development.
Empirical Strategy and Data
We use two different panel datasets covering the periods 1970 to 2005 and 1870 to 1940, and 133 and 31 countries, respectively. 10 Our main specification uses five year averages of our measures of financial development, resource rents, political institutions and income.
However we also test the robustness of our results using annual data, three year averages, and decadal averages. To estimate whether the relationship between financial development and resource rents depends systematically on the quality of political institutions, we use the following model:
where F D it is the level of financial development in country i averaged over years t − 4 to t, α i is a country dummy variable which indicates the use of country fixed effects, β t is a year dummy variable controlling for time varying common shocks, RR it are natural resource rents in country i averaged over years t − 4 to t, 11 D it−5 is a measure of the quality of political institutions or democracy, respectively, in country i averaged over the period t − 9 to t − 5, y it is log income per capita in country i averaged over years t − 4 to t, and X it is a vector of other control variables.
The motive behind including country fixed effects is to control for time invariant country specific fixed factors such as legal origin and social capital.
We are mainly interest in the effect of a change in RR it on F D it . The point estimate of
. Therefore we focus on the coefficients γ 1 and γ 3 . We expect γ 1 to be significantly negative and γ 3 to be significantly positive. This would imply that there is a threshold level of D it−5 below which the effect of resource rents on financial development is negative, and above which the effect is positive.
We use the log of private credit to GDP ratio from Beck et al. 12 This allows us to use panel data and minimizes the sample selection bias both across countries and over time. Third, it is also widely used in the literature as a proxy for financial development. 13 Nevertheless, we also use log money and quasi-money (M2)
to GDP ratio, log bank assets to GDP ratio, log bank deposits to GDP ratio, log financial deposits to GDP ratio, log stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, and log bank returns on assets to GDP ratio as alternative measures of financial development. However it is not unreasonable to assume that deposits and credit are likely to be correlated. In any case this is the best that we could do to cover the period 1870 to 1940 and 31 countries.
Log of private credit to
14 Our main natural resource measure (RR it ) is the log of rents from natural resources (which include energy, minerals, and forestry) to GDP ratio and is from the World Bank's adjusted net savings dataset. It covers the period 1970 to 2005. The rent from a particular commodity is defined as the difference between its world price and average extraction costs both expressed in current US dollars. 15 The world price of a particular commodity is global and only varies over time. The extraction costs however are variable over time and across countries. We calculate total rents accruing from a variety of natural resources by following a three step procedure. First, we multiply the natural resource rent per unit of output of a particular commodity by the total volume extracted of that commodity. Second, we aggregate them across commodities for a country and a particular year. Third, we divide them by GDP and average them for five year periods and take natural logs to smooth out any noise in the data. Our data shows Switzerland is the least resource intensive country in 1995 with a value of RR it at -14.8, and Iraq is the most resource intensive country in 2005 with a value of at 0.8. The corresponding ratios of resource rents to GDP are close to zero and around 220 percent, respectively.
RR it is our preferred measure of natural resource revenues for the following reasons.
First, it is best able to capture our notion of natural resource revenues in the theoretical model, where these revenues are defined as rents from natural resources. Second, it is fairly wide in terms of country coverage. Therefore we are able to minimize the risk of sample selection bias. It also provides a reasonably long time dimension. Third, this variable is now been used by a number of recent studies (see for example, Ross, 2006; Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010) . Fourth, it may be best able to bypass endogeneity related concerns as it is unlikely that current financial development in a country will affect resource rents as the latter predominantly depend on the stock of natural resources and exogenous world prices of natural resources. Nevertheless, we also use lagged RR it to allay concerns of endogeneity. Normalizing resource rent with GDP may also bring in endogeneity concerns as F D it may affect GDP. To circumvent that problem we also estimate our model using resource rents and financial development 15 Hamilton and Clemens (1999) provide a detailed description of this dataset.
when they are both normalized by population instead of GDP. Furthermore, we also use GMM estimation method using lagged RR it and lagged D it−5 as instruments to address endogeneity and omitted variable concerns.
For the 1870 to 1940 period, we use the log of the primary product exports to GDP given the unavailability of direct measures, it is perhaps the best the we could do to capture resource rents Ω.
Our measure of democracy and political institutions (D it−5 ) is calculated using the Polity IV database, which is described by Marshall and Jaggers (2002) . and all these other lagged measures are perhaps able to address the endogeneity related concerns. Even though financially developed countries are likely to be more democratic, it is less likely that financial development in year t will affect political institutions in year t − 5. Nevertheless, we also use democracy twice lagged (D it−10 ) and D it−10 × RR it as instruments for democracy and estimate the model using the Fuller version of Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) instrumental variable method. The advantage of using Fuller LIML over standard instrumental variable estimator is that the former works better even when the instruments are weak. Furthermore, we also estimate the model using GMM where lagged explanatory variables are used as instruments.
Log per capita income and several other additional control variables are also used in the study. Detailed definitions and sources of all variables are available in Appendix A1. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the major variables used.
Finally, there are concerns of multicollinearity and omitted variables that we need to address in our estimation. First, there is a possibility that a high correlation between RR it and D it−5 could inflate the standard errors of our estimates. Ross (2001) documents that natural resource abundance and oil in particular have antidemocratic properties. This may bring in issues of multicollinearity in our specification. We find that the correlation between RR it and D it−5 is -0.03 and the correlation between RR it and D it−5 × RR it is 0.24.
16 Alternatively, there is also a strong view that a simple dichotomy between democracy and nondemocracy is the most appropriate empirical definition (e.g., Przeworski et al., 2000) . However, the latter certainly involves approximation and may bias estimates (Collier and Hoeffler, 2009) . A related view is that democratic capital or longer-lived democratic experience is important (e.g., Treisman, 2000; and Persson and Tabellini, 2006) .
The magnitudes of these correlations are not large enough to cause any serious problem of multicollinearity. Second, we tackle the issue of omitted variables by controlling for time varying common shocks, country fixed effects and additional covariates that are expected to influence the level of financial development. Table 2 presents our main results. In column 1 we look at the unconditional correlation between resource rents and financial development. We notice a statistically significant negative relationship. This suggests that resource rents are associated with low levels of financial development. But this association may be driven by omitted factors (such as income, political structure, legal structure, culture, geography, time varying common shocks etc.) influencing both resource rent and financial development. To tackle this issue in columns 2 and 3 we add log per capita income, country dummies and year dummies.
Empirical Evidence
We notice that the negative relationship survives however the magnitude of the coefficient falls. To estimate how the effect of natural resources on financial development depends on the quality of political institutions, in column 4 we add the interaction term D it × RR it and D it . We notice that the negative coefficient on RR it survives, and that the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant. To address endogeneity concerns, in column 5 we use the lagged measure D it−5 to estimate equation (1) . We find that coefficients are very similar. In an average country, resource rents inhibit financial development unless D it−5 is above the threshold level of 0.9, which corresponds to a POLITY2 score of around 8. In column 6, we use lagged resource rents RR it−5 to allay concerns of reverse causation between resource rents and financial development, as financial development today is unlikely to affect resource rents five years ago. Our main results remain unaffected both in terms of magnitude and sign.
To put the estimates of our main specification (column 5) into perspective, let us focus on Nigeria -a resource rich country (RR NGA2005 = 3.86, i.e., a resource rents to GDP ratio of almost 50 percent) with weak democratic institutions (D NGA2000 = 0.65, i.e., a One potential concern is that our preferred measure of the quality of political institutions, D it−5 , could be endogenous. However, the endogeneity problem should not be too serious as D it−5 is a lagged measure and less likely to be endogenous than a current measure. Furthermore, Monte-Carlo evidence shows that the bias of OLS is reduced when an endogenous variable is interacted with a continuous exogenous variable (Harrison, 2008) .
Therefore, the bias of the coefficient on D it−5 × RR it should be rather small even if D it−5 is endogenous as RR it is a continuous variable that is likely to be exogenous. Moreover, as we discuss below, our results also hold when we use long-run measures of the quality of political institutions, which are even less likely to be endogenous. Nevertheless, we address the potential endogeneity of D it−5 and the interaction term D it−5 × RR it by employing the instrumental variable approach. The instruments need to be correlated to D it−5 and D it−5 × RR it , respectively, and orthogonal to the error term. As it is often the case, finding strong and valid instruments is not an easy task. In column 7 we use the twice lagged democracy measure D it−10 and the interaction term D it−10 × RR it as instruments. These instruments are highly correlated to D it−5 and D it−5 × RR it , and it is plausible that they are orthogonal to the error term. They are also not weak instruments as they satisfy the Stock-Yogo criteria. We notice that the coefficients of interest remain highly significant when we use these instruments. In column 8, to further allay concerns of endogeneity, we estimate the model using D it−10 , RR it−5 and D it−10 ×RR it−5 as instruments for D it−5 , RR it and D it−5 × RR it , which corresponds to GMM estimation method, and our main results hold.
17 Table 3 as an additional control variable in column 3, and our main result survives. In column 4 we replace D it−5 with lagged constraints on the executive (EXCONST it−5 ), which is another variable sometimes used to measure property rights. This measure however is not the best to capture North's notion of an extractive state (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005) . Moreover, EXCONST it is also from the Polity IV database, and it is one of the components of the democracy code used to derive POLITY2. Given this definitional overlap between D it and EXCONST it , it is not surprising that the estimates are similar as our main results. In column 5 we add EXCONST it−5 as an additional control variable to our main specifica-tion. We find that the coefficients on RR it and D it−5 × RR it remain significant, suggesting that the relationship between resource rents and financial development indeed depends on the quality of political institutions. Table 4 asks the question where this nonlinear effect of resource rents on financial development is coming from. In column 1 we test whether the effect is driven by a particular year or a group of years. We do this by allowing the interaction term D it−5 × RR it to be different across time, and we estimate separate year effects. We notice that the effect is uniform in terms of statistical significance over the period 1970 to 2005. The magnitude of the effect peaks in 1980 and declines afterwards. Overall, the effect is also jointly significant. Developed economies are likely to be democracies and also to have developed financial markets. In column 2, we allow the effect to vary across different country-income groups to test whether it is predominant among developed economies or any other group.
We notice that the effect is uniform across all country-income groups and hence not driven by developed economies. In column 3 we show that the same holds true if we allow the interaction term to differ for OECD and non-OECD countries.
In table 5 we add additional covariates into our main specification to address the issue of omitted variables. In column 1 we add foreign aid as an additional control variable, as aid may lower the desire and need of governments to borrow from financial markets. In columns 2-4 we add foreign direct investments, a trade liberalization index, and trade shares, respectively. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that trade liberalization and foreign investments help easing the grip of the elite on the financial market, thus being beneficial for financial development. In columns 5-10 we control for schooling, investments, inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, terms of trade, commodity prices relative to the GDP deflator, and financial openness. Schooling should be beneficial for financial development as a better educated population will be better able to process complex financial information thereby increasing access and participation. Investments generally require credit. Therefore more 20 investments should be associated with higher financial development. Less inequality should increase access and participation thereby strengthening financial markets. Terms of trade and commodity prices relative to GDP deflator are expected to capture Dutch Disease effects.
18 Lastly, we control for the effect of financial openness using the index of capital account openness by Chinn and Ito (2006) . Our main results survive in all instances. Table 6 presents robustness results with alternative samples. Columns 1-5 checks whether our results are influenced by any particular continent. We take out Africa, Asia, Europe, the Americas, and Neo-Europe 19 one at a time from our base sample. In columns 6-8 we also omit influential observations using Cook's distance, DFITS, and Welsch distance formulas respectively. Our main results hold in all these alternative samples.
In table 7 we use alternative measures of financial development. In columns 1-4 we use log of M2 to GDP ratio, log deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio, log bank deposit to GDP ratio, and log financial system deposits to GDP ratio, and our main results survive.
In columns 5 and 6, we use log stock market capitalization to GDP ratio and log bank returns on assets to GDP ratio. The coefficients of interest still show the predicted signs, but they are no longer statistically significant. This may be due to a significant reduction in sample size in these two specifications. Furthermore, in spite of stock market expansion globally, stock market exposure till date remains fairly limited in most countries in our sample. Therefore it is not surprising that we are not finding statistically significant effects in columns 5 and 6. Further, in column 7 we use our preferred measures of resource rents and financial development but on this occasion normalizing them with population instead on GDP. Our main results survive. 18 The ratio of export to import prices is the standard measure of the terms of trade. However, in order to assess the Dutch Disease impact (or the impact of external price shocks on the economy as a whole), the price of tradables should also be related to the prices of non-tradables. That is, a commodity export price shock must be expressed relative to the price of GDP (GDP Deflator) in order to assess its Dutch Disease impact. Hence we use trends in price of commodities relative to price of GDP in addition to terms of trade.
In table 8 we test our results using alternative measures of the quality of political institutions. In column 1 we replace our net democracy measure D it−5 with the lagged fraction of years a country has been democratic since 1950 (d it−5 ), which is a long run measure of democracy and could be seen as a measure of democratic capital. 20 In any year a country is deemed to be democratic if it registers a positive POLITY2 score. Our main results survive. In column 2 we replace D it−5 with the lagged freedom house democracy index (DF H it−5 ). The coefficient on the interaction term is still positive and significant. The coefficient on RR it remains negative but is no longer statistically significant. In columns 3 and 4 we use the Boix and Rosato Democracy dummy (DDUM it−5 ) and the Polity IV democracy dummy (P IV D it−5 ), which is equal to one if and only if the POLITY2 score is positive. Our results survive again. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that our main results are robust to the use of alternative measures of democracy and the quality of political institutions.
In table 9 we check what happens if we use different data frequency. In columns 1, 2, and 3 we use annual data, three year averages, and decadal averages, respectively. Results are very similar as with five year averages.
In table 10 we test our theoretical predictions using an historical sample of 31 countries covering the period 1870 to 1940. The dependent variable used here is the log of deposits in commercial and savings bank to GDP ratio as we are unable to find data on private credit for a large enough sample for this period. Also note that we only have data for log primary exports to GDP (sxp it ) for this period which at best is an indirect measure of resource rents.
Nevertheless, it allows us to take a good crack at testing our theoretical predictions for this period even though the sample is considerably smaller than the 1970 to 2005 sample.
In column 1 we use our standard measure of the quality of political institutions, D it−5 . We notice that the coefficients on sxp it and sxp it × D it−5 have the predicted signs, but are not statistically significant. A noticeable feature however is the significance and positive sign of D it−5 , which indicates that democratization and sound political institutions were good for financial development in this period. In column 2 we replace D it−5 by lagged Polity IV democracy dummy (P IV D it−5 ), a cardinal measure of political institutions. We again find a direct positive effect of political institutions on financial development P IV D it−5 , and we notice that the coefficients on sxp it and sxp it × P IV it−5 have still the predicted signs and are now statistically significant. 21 These results suggest that already in the period 1870 to 1940 natural resource revenues may have hindered financial development in undemocratic countries, but not in democratic ones. However we acknowledge that there are shortcomings related to endogeneity and sample size which we are unable to address given data limitations. We leave these issues for future work.
Overall these empirical findings support our theoretical prediction that resource rents inhibit financial development in countries with poor political institutions, but not in countries with strong political institutions.
In our theoretical model, natural resource rents inhibit financial development in the presence of weak political institutions by lowering contract enforcement or, more generally, the quality of contracting institutions. We now make an attempt to test whether resource rents indeed affect financial development through the contracting institutions channel. Due to the unavailability of reliable measures of contracting institutions in a panel we thereby have to rely on cross-section data. institutions. 23 The first of these measures, called the check measure, describes procedural 21 It is not surprising that the dummy works here whereas the continuous measure does not, because the dummy magnifies the variation in political institutions across countries in a small sample of countries with very little representation from Africa. 22 The ICRG measure of repudiation of government contracts is sometimes used in the literature as a proxy for contracting institutions. This measure however is not appropriate for our purposes as it focuses on institutions that regulate the relationship between the state and its subjects and not on institutions that provide the legal framework for contracts between ordinary citizens. In column 1 of table 11 we estimate our main specification using cross-section data.
The results are qualitatively similar to our panel estimates. In column 2 and 3 we add our two measures of contracting institutions as independent variables. We notice that the coefficient estimates on RR i2000 and RR i2000 × D i1995 are no longer statistically significant.
The measures of contracting institutions however are statistically significant, suggesting that weak contracting institutions tend to lower financial development. These results are consistent with our prediction that the effects of resource rents on financial development are working through the contracting institutions channel. To be more certain, in columns 4 and 5 we look at the relationship between resource rents and contracting institutions. We find that resource rents lead to weak contracting institutions if and only if the quality of political institutions is low. These results further support our prediction that the effects of resource rents on financial development work through the contracting institutions channel.
Conclusions
We These findings imply that resource-rich countries have a tendency to be financially underdeveloped, possibly because governments have less incentives to foster contract enforcement when getting large natural resource rents, and because the financial sector cannot prosper without strong contract enforcement. But this tendency can be checked if strong and democratic political institutions ensure that governments are accountable towards the people. Therefore, a major implication of our results is that democratization could help to foster financial development in resource-rich countries. Log of private credit to population: Log of private credit by banks and other financial institutions to population ratio. Source: Authors' calculation using Beck et al. (2000) and WDI Online.
Log of money and quasi-money (M2) to GDP: Log of money and quasi-money (M2) to GDP ratio.
M2 includes currency, demand deposits, traveler's cheques and other chequeable deposits, retail money market mutual fund balances, saving deposits (including money market deposit accounts), and small time deposits. Source: WDI Online.
Log of deposit money bank assets to GDP: Log of deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio.
Source: Beck et al. (2000).
Log of bank deposits to GDP: Log of bank deposits to GDP ratio. Source: Beck et al. (2000) .
Log of financial system deposits to GDP: Log of financial system deposits to GDP ratio. Source:
Beck et al. (2000).
Log of stock market capitalization to GDP: Log of stock market capitalization to GDP ratio. Log Primary Product Exports to GDP (sxp it ): Log of primary products exports to GDP ratio. 
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LIML Fuller 1 IV Estimate (GMM)
Resource Rent Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. Sample years are every fifth year from 1970 to 2005. High Income is a dummy for per capita GDP in 2000 being 10, 000 constant 1996 international dollars or more; Middle Income for between 5,000 and 10,000; Low Income for between 2,500 and 5,000; Very Low Income for less than 2,500. The F-test is the joint test of significance of the interaction terms and Year Dummies (for column 1); interaction terms and Income Dummies (for column 2); interaction terms and OECD Dummy (for column 3). 
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Resource Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All the regressions reported above are carried out without an intercept. Sample years are every fifth year from 1970 to 2005. Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All the regressions reported above are carried out without an intercept. Sample years are every fifth year from 1870 to 1940. Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation.
